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Social investment policies are generally considered to be widely popular among the public and policymakers alike as they are expected to generate social and economic benefits, and to create political payoffs for governments implementing such policies. However, empirically, we observe strong and persistent variation across countries in their design of social investment policies. Focusing on early childhood education and care as a central element of social investment, I argue in this theoretical contribution that once we take into account the country-specific political and institutional context, the popularity of social investment should not be taken for granted. Contingent on who benefits from expansive childcare policies there can be a substantial potential of conflict in public attitudes between different societal groups. Building on theories of policy feedback, I elaborate the concept of perceived relative policy payoffs. How individuals perceive the costs and benefits associated with childcare policies can amplify or attenuate the potential of conflict in public attitudes towards expanding childcare. If an expansion of childcare comes at the cost of some groups in society and if reforms benefit only more narrowly defined groups, preferences are likely to be more conflictive and the political viability of expansive reforms appears more uncertain. The framework developed in this paper has implications for theories of policy feedback and the politics of social investment. Furthermore, it suggests that instead of a convergence towards a fully fletched paradigmatic social investment welfare state, we are likely to observe persistent variation across countries in their design of social investment policies.
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