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  • This article discusses three major issues related to tripartite social pacts: first, the puzzles they present for classic theories of corporatism; second, the contrasts between the political economies of ‘competitive concertation’ and Keynesian coordination; and third, the problems of assessing their effects in the context of complex causality. The main focus is on one specific policy area: negotiated welfare state reforms. The conclusion is that though such negotiations have dominated the process of welfare state recalibration in Europe during the 1990s, tripartite social pacts are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success. (xsd:string)
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  • 2005 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2005 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1177/0959680105052235 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1 (xsd:string)
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  • Social Pacts Revisited: ‘Competitive Concertation’ and Complex Causality in Negotiated Welfare State Reforms (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • In: European Journal of Industrial Relations, 11, 2005, 1, 107-126 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-222525 ()
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  • 11 (xsd:string)