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  • This article analyzes Germany's policy-making in response to the Corona crisis between January 2020 and March 2021. Two theoretical perspectives are advanced. The first concerns how the government's imposition of a 'state of emergency' affects liberal democratic policy-making resulting in the closure of deliberation in favor of top-down imposition. The second perspective looks at different types of policy learning under crisis conditions. The central thesis is that Germany's emergency regime failed to facilitate effective policy-making since it closed down venues in which policy learning could occur. Thus, the state of emergency combined authoritarianism and inefficiency. A variety of explanations are advanced to clarify causes for the sluggishness of the German federal, regional, and local government levels to meet Corona-related challenges. (xsd:string)
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  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1 (xsd:string)
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  • Germany's Corona Crisis: The State of Emergency and Policy(Mis)learning (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • In: Journal of the Korean-German Association for Social Sciences / Zeitschrift der Koreanisch-Deutschen Gesellschaft für Sozialwissenschaften, 31, 2021, 1, 29-75 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-72220-8 ()
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  • 31 (xsd:string)