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  • This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders remained. Original data on budget, staff, units, organisational structure and presidential assignments demonstrate that presidential power ought to be conceptualised as a polymorphous phenomenon that varies depending on the level of analysis. Researchers should refrain from over-personalising accounts of authoritarian regimes at the expense of more structural, organisational elements such as ‘institutional presidencies’. (xsd:string)
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  • 2020 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2020 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1080/09668136.2020.1749566 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1465-3427 ()
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  • Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia's Presidential Administration (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Europe-Asia Studies, 2020, 1-33 (xsd:string)
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