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?:about
?:abstract
  • "In an overlapping-generations model with endogenous birth rates, I design a reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system, which internalises positive externalities of children - their pension contributions. Individuals may differ in their preferences for children and their ability to have children at all. They can choose between the status-quo flat-rate benefits and a new system, in which they get just the benefits that are (on average) financed by their own children, reduced by an amount which is used to subsidise the flat-rate system. Whereas people with low child preferences keep the status quo, people with high child preferences choose the individualised system, having the optimal incentives to raise children and a higher utility." (author's abstract) (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2006 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2006 (xsd:gyear)
?:duplicate
?:hasFulltext
  • true (xsd:boolean)
is ?:hasPart of
?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
?:linksURN
?:location
is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Pension and children: Pareto improvement with heterogeneous preferences (xsd:string)
?:provider
?:publicationType
  • Arbeitspapier (xsd:string)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-318573 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 3/2006 (xsd:string)