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?:abstract
  • Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a legitimate authority and leaves an unresolved gap in the transition from peer-punishment to centralized punishment. Here we show that the origins of centralized punishment could lie in individuals’ distinct ability to punish defectors. In our laboratory experiment, we vary the structure of the punishment situation to disentangle the effects of punitive preferences, monetary incentives, and individual punishment costs on the punishment of defectors. We find that actors tacitly coordinate on the strongest group member to punish defectors, even if the strongest individual incurs a net loss from punishment. Such coordination leads to a more effective and more efficient provision of a cooperative environment than we observe in groups of all equals. Our results show that even an arbitrary assignment of an individual to a focal position in the social hierarchy can trigger the endogenous emergence of more centralized forms of punishment. (xsd:string)
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?:category
  • Economic theory and methodology (en)
  • Economics (en)
  • Military Sociology (en)
  • Militärsoziologie (de)
  • Organisationssoziologie (de)
  • Organizational Sociology (en)
  • Other Fields of Sociology (en)
  • Social Psychology (en)
  • Sonstiges zur Soziologie (de)
  • Sozialpsychologie (de)
  • Wirtschaftstheorien und Methoden (de)
  • Wirtschaftswissenschaften (de)
?:citationString
  • Diekmann, Andreas, & Przepiorka, Wojtek (2015): Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans. GESIS, Cologne. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909 (en)
  • Diekmann, Andreas, & Przepiorka, Wojtek (2015): Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans. GESIS, Köln. Datenfile Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909 (de)
?:conditionsOfAccess
  • Free access (without registration) (en)
  • Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung) (de)
?:currentVersion
  • 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909 (xsd:string)
?:dataCollection
  • Laboratory experiment (en)
  • Laborexperiment (de)
?:dateCreated
  • 2015 (xsd:gyear)
?:dateModified
  • 2015-01-01 (xsd:date)
?:datePublished
  • 2015 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.7802/1909 ()
?:endDate
  • 2014-01-01 (xsd:date)
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
is ?:hasPart of
?:license
  • CC BY-NC-SA 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de) (xsd:string)
?:name
  • Replication data: Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans (xsd:string)
?:principalInvestigator
  • Diekmann, Andreas (xsd:string)
  • Przepiorka, Wojtek (xsd:string)
  • Przepiorka, Wojtek;Utrecht University;Contact Person (xsd:string)
?:provider
?:publicationType
  • SowiDataNet|datorium (en)
?:publisher
?:selectionMethod
  • All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment. (de)
  • All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment. (en)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS, Cologne. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909 (en)
  • GESIS, Köln. Datenfile Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/1909 (de)
  • GESIS-SowiDataNet|datorium (xsd:string)
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?:startDate
  • 2014-01-01 (xsd:date)
?:studyPublications
  • Diekmann, Andreas and Wojtek Przepiorka. 2015. "Punitive Preferences, Monetary Incentives and Tacit Coordination in the Punishment of Defectors Promote Cooperation in Humans." Scientific Reports 5:10321.;10.1038/srep10321 (xsd:string)
?:thematicCollection
  • Bildung (de)
  • Education (en)
rdf:type
?:variableMeasured
  • In total, 216 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 57.9% were female and they were 23.1 years old on average (sd = 5.57). (xsd:string)