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  • This article investigates two accounts of political propaganda in autocratic regimes. One argues that propaganda's content does not matter substantively and that propaganda is mostly a signal of the regime's overwhelming power over citizens. A second argues that propaganda is substantively meaningful: autocrats may communicate strategically either by attracting attention through highlighting the regime's strengths or by distracting attention away from the regime's malperformance. Using nearly 135,000 North Korean state-generated news articles between 1997 and 2018 we show that North Korea systematically adjusted its communication strategies following the leadership transfer from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. (xsd:string)
?:citation
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2023 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2023 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1080/10758216.2021.2012199 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issn
  • 1557-783X ()
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  • 3 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Why It Matters What Autocrats Say: Assessing Competing Theories of Propaganda (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Problems of Post-Communism, 70, 2023, 3, 241-252 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-99803-5 ()
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  • 70 (xsd:string)