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Party-political ultranationalism was and still is unusually weak, in electoral terms, in post-Soviet Ukraine. The three main political forces, the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda," the Right Sector, and the National Corps, have-despite increased public awareness about them and growing general nationalist sentiments among the population of Ukraine- remained politically marginalized after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan. Neither the loss of Crimea nor the war in Donbas have increased the electoral support of radical nationalist groups. On the contrary, the united far right's presidential candidate and party list received embarassing results in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections. That was, moreover, in spite of the fact that most of the relevant groups have, since 2017, been demonstratively and purposefully cooperating with each other in order to, for instance, avoid a split of the nationalist electorate, as had been the case in the 2014 parliamentary elections. However, in the context of Russia's ongoing "hybrid war" against Ukraine, ultra-right activists (sometimes associated with ultra-nationalist political parties) have gained greater recognition among the Ukrainian public since 2014. The activities of anti-democratic non-governmental organizations and their periodic cooperation with the Ukrainian state require careful monitoring. This article provides an overview of the development of the right-wing radical political spectrum in Ukraine before and after the "Revolution of Dignity." The bibliography contains most of the relevant academic literature on this topic in Ukrainian, English, Russian, and German.
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