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Next to key global actors, Middle Eastern states have sought to make inroads into Africa of late. At the helm are Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which despite being the region's dominant middle powers struggle to compete with more potent international actors. To make up for such imbalances, they build on cultural and religious proximity with African societies in their public-diplomacy strategies. Public diplomacy is a means to mobilise soft-power resources, including societal ones. Non-state actors thus gain in importance. Yet to the extent that autocracies integrate them in corresponding strategies - in the realm of education, for example - doubts arise about their independence. Iran's public diplomacy in Africa, notably regarding education, piggybacks on putative non-state actors. While presented to foreign audiences as non-governmental organisations - and often holding such legal status -, they are heavily dependent on and regulated by the state. Saudi Arabia is a public-diplomacy pioneer in Africa. While it is aware of Iranian and Turkish educational successes, it is also the least active of the three in Africa's educational sector nowadays. This reluctance to follow suit also springs from recent efforts to de-emphasise Islam. Non-state actors have continued to play a crucial role in Turkey's public diplomacy in Africa, with their activities, particularly in terms of education, predating state-led initiatives. However, since 2013 Turkey's endeavours have increasingly become state-controlled, best visible in the establishment of new state institutions across Africa.
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