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  • Political short-termism prioritizes short-term net policy benefits over long-term benefits and thus can hinder policy investments that impose short-term costs to society to address long-term policy challenges. This literature review explores when political short-termism can be driven and mitigated in a democratic system by reviewing empirical and experimental studies and identifying the various factors that can influence policy investments: elections, economic conditions, power-sharing arrangements, partisanship, the presence of compensation schemes, and media coverage among politicians; discounts of future policy benefits, policy trade-offs, political ideology, and socioeconomic and demographic factors among voters; and compliance costs, power-sharing arrangements, compensations, and long-term political signaling from governments among special interest groups. Finally, I discuss the findings and provide suggestions for future research. (xsd:string)
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  • 2024 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2024 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.17645/pag.7764 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 2183-2463 ()
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  • The Conditionality of Political Short‐Termism: A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Politics and Governance, 12, 2024 (xsd:string)
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  • 12 (xsd:string)