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  • In this short article, I discuss some of the political economy aspects of the ongoing pension reform in Armenia. The focus is on two opposing forces - taxpayers' quite significant resistance to the reform vis-à-vis government's imperative to reform due to fiscal constraints - that are likely to shape the outcome of the reform. The discussion is centered around a fiscal contract where the government is forced to make democratic concessions in return for the taxpayers' commitment to comply with its new institutions. I argue that this conflict may push Armenia into a virtuous circle of development. (xsd:string)
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  • 2014 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2014 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1867-9323 ()
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  • 60 (xsd:string)
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  • The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Armenia (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Caucasus Analytical Digest, 2014, 60, 2-5 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-93509-9 ()