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?:abstract
  • In June 2022, the EU granted candidate status to Ukraine. In December 2023, after a respective Commission recommendation, the Council voted to start accession negotiations with Ukraine. This rapid turn in EU-Ukraine relations is mostly a result of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and of the subsequent, so far successful fight of Ukrainians for their freedom. On what assumptions does the Union's (re)turn to enlargement as an instrument ultimately rest? How does the realistic prospect of enlargement help Ukraine? Are the EU and Ukraine prepared to start and finalize what many see as a speedy "geopolitical enlargement"? This article argues that neither the EU nor Ukraine are currently prepared for an accession process of this magnitude, and that especially the "geopolitical" argument is thin at best. Yet, in terms of policy options for the Union, enlargement seems to be without alternative. (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2024 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2024 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.3929/ethz-b-000656671 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issn
  • 2941-7139 ()
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  • 4 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Ukraine and the EU: Enlargement without Alternative? (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Ukrainian Analytical Digest, 2024, 4, 14-18 (xsd:string)
rdf:type
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-92299-1 ()