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  • Environmental governance in many high-income democracies relies to some extent on self-regulation by the private sector. Yet, this policy mode is contested and proponents of top-down government regulation argue that voluntary corporate sustainability commitments remain shallow and rarely are more than greenwashing. I assess to what extent firms’ business conduct is subject to societal checks and balances, in particular, whether public support for regulation constitutes a control mechanism of corporate contributions to environmental goods. I rely on an original survey experiment (N = 2112) conducted with a representative sample of the Swiss voting population. The analysis shows that accusing firms of greenwashing reduces both citizens' perceived effectiveness of self-regulation and perceived synergy of corporate profits and environmental protection. However, this attitudinal shift only translates into modest updates in respondents' policy preferences. As a result, short-run shifts in public support for regulation are an unlikely societal control mechanism of business conduct. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2023 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2023 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1017/S0143814X22000277 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issn
  • 0143-814X ()
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  • 1 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Greenwashing and public demand for government regulation (xsd:string)
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?:publicationType
  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Public Policy, 43, 2023, 1, 179-198 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-92074-3 ()
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  • 43 (xsd:string)