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  • As the need for a participatory approach towards a sustainable landscape development grows, this paper has applied the cooperative game theory to analyse the mechanism of entering a landscape agreement which requires the participation and initiative of local residents and stakeholders. The results confirmed that a landscape agreement only becomes possible with a certain level of supporters and the optimal situation is when all participants agree. Moreover, the possibility of free riders, which would prevent reaching a universal agreement, was also confirmed. The effect of government subsidies for landscape considerate building and the enforcement of penalties for building without were also examined. As a result, we learned that subsidies and the enforcement of penalties influences the number of supporters required for the landscape agreement and in preventing free riders. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2017 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2017 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.37043/JURA.2017.9.2.6 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issn
  • 2067-4082 ()
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  • 2 (xsd:string)
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  • Cooperative game theory approach to establishing a landscape agreement (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis, 9, 2017, 2, 187-196 (xsd:string)
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?:volumeNumber
  • 9 (xsd:string)