PropertyValue
?:about
?:abstract
  • A close reading of Russia's nuclear statements and actions during the first seven months of its war against Ukraine reveals a threefold approach. Moscow is walking a fine line between a well-crafted and successful deterrence strategy to prevent foreign military intervention; a more modest and rather unsuccessful attempt at dissuading foreign aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; and incremental nuclear coercion against Kyiv that spurred Western deterrence messaging in response. This analysis reveals a careful Russian approach, suggesting that cost-benefit calculations are likely to continue to render nuclear escalation unlikely. However, nuclear use cannot be fully discounted, particularly if war-related developments severely imperil the sur­vival of Russia's regime. (author's abstract) (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2022 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2022 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.18449/2022C60 ()
?:duplicate
?:hasFulltext
  • true (xsd:boolean)
is ?:hasPart of
?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
?:issn
  • 2747-5107 ()
?:linksDOI
?:linksURN
?:location
is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Russia's catch-all nuclear rhetoric in its war against Ukraine: a balancing act between deterrence, dissuasion, and compellence strategies (xsd:string)
?:provider
?:publicationType
  • Stellungnahme (xsd:string)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-85130-7 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 60/2022 (xsd:string)