PropertyValue
?:about
?:abstract
  • Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international (trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However, the Commission's responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine-grained causal mechanism derived from information processing theory and an extensive process-tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post-Lisbon, we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information-processing system, the 'early-warning system', which had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post-Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous to the parliamentary context ('externalities') as well as internal uncertainties ('internalities') add constant unpredictability to the Commission's reading of the European Parliament. (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.17645/pag.v9i3.4014 ()
?:duplicate
?:hasFulltext
  • true (xsd:boolean)
is ?:hasPart of
?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
?:isPartOf
?:issn
  • 2183-2463 ()
?:issueNumber
  • 3 (xsd:string)
?:linksDOI
is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Detecting Looming Vetoes: Getting the European Parliament's Consent in Trade Agreements (xsd:string)
?:provider
?:publicationType
  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Politics and Governance, 9, 2021, 3, 74-84 (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:volumeNumber
  • 9 (xsd:string)