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?:abstract
  • The idea of including a right of secession in democratic constitutions has been discussed by different political and legal theorists; however, little has been said on the matter from the point of view of democratic-republican political philosophy. This article undertakes this effort by means of a normative analysis of Quebec’s constitutional right of secession, as outlined in the Quebec Secession Reference. This analysis shows how the non-unilateral nature of this right minimises the risks for republican freedom (as non-domination) and inclusion in the Quebec secession conflict, while the fact that it is limited to a national constitutional framework dampens this achievement. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.17645/pag.v9i4.4569 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issn
  • 2183-2463 ()
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  • 4 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • An Imperfect Firewall: Quebec's Constitutional Right of Secession as a Device Against Domination (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Politics and Governance, 9, 2021, 4, 475-482 (xsd:string)
rdf:type
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?:volumeNumber
  • 9 (xsd:string)