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  • In this paper I will argue that when Aristotle uses the word 'ἀρχή' (commonly translated as 'principle,' 'beginning,' 'origin,' or 'starting-point') he is often referring to what we call a condition, whether necessary, sufficient or necessary and sufficient. To this end I will discuss how conditions for being, change, and knowledge, as identified by Aristotle, can be equated to ontological, physical and noetic principles, respectively. (xsd:string)
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  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2021 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.31977/grirfi.v21i3.2488 ()
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  • 2178-1036 ()
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  • Aristotle's principles as conditions (xsd:string)
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  • In: Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 21, 2021, 3, 112-120 (xsd:string)
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  • 21 (xsd:string)