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  • This paper studies mechanism design under the level-k solution concept. The first result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be level-k implementable. In some environments, this necessary condition is equivalent to Bayesian incentive compatibility, making level-k implementation more restrictive than Bayesian implementation. The second result shows that this is not a general implication. In the bilateral trade environment ex post efficient trade is always possible under level-k implementation. Further, ex post efficient trade is possible in a mechanism that is robust to different specifications of beliefs about the levels of reasoning of others and to any specification of beliefs about payoffs. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2017 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2017 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade (xsd:string)
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  • Arbeitspapier (xsd:string)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
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  • SP II 2017-303 (xsd:string)