PropertyValue
?:about
?:abstract
  • We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership. (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
?:duplicate
?:hasFulltext
  • true (xsd:boolean)
is ?:hasPart of
?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
?:linksURN
?:location
is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members (xsd:string)
?:provider
?:publicationType
  • Arbeitspapier (xsd:string)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66132-3 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 10 (xsd:string)