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?:about
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  • A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid-caps significantly diminishes the discouragement effect. Bid-caps can also improve revenue. Most deviations from Nash equilibrium can be explained by the level-k model of reasoning. (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2016 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2016 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions (xsd:string)
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?:publicationType
  • Arbeitspapier (xsd:string)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:volumeNumber
  • SP II 2016-307 (xsd:string)