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  • In this article, I analyze Wittgenstein’s conception of the nature and function of philosophy, discussing his deflationary method used for the treatment of philosophical problems. I show the reasons by which Wittgenstein would have understood philosophy as an elucidative activity, whose main purpose would be to dissolve philosophical problems through the logical (and/or phenomenological) analysis. In order to do so, I divide the article into three sections, in which I discuss Wittgenstein's thinking from the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (1921), from Some Remarks on Logical Form (1929) and from the Philosophical Remarks (1929-1930), respectively. Initially, I present Wittgenstein's critique of the possibility of interpreting philosophy as a discipline that, as with science, can offer a theoretical representation of some domain of objects or facts. Subsequently, I list some changes in his description of the philosophical activity, showing that until the beginning of his middle-period philosophy, Wittgenstein maintains the perspective that the function of philosophy would be to distinguish between real (solvable) theoretical problems and philosophical pseudo-problems. (xsd:string)
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  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.31977/grirfi.v19i2.1140 ()
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  • 2178-1036 ()
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  • 2 (xsd:string)
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  • Do "Tractatus" às "Observações filosóficas": reflexões sobre a natureza da filosofia (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • In: Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 19, 2019, 2, 182-193 (xsd:string)
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  • 19 (xsd:string)