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  • In My Philosophical Development, Bertrand Russell states that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s second philosophy seemed completely unintelligible, composed by trivial positive doctrines and unfounded negative doctrines. Such critique is still currently considered a development of Russell’s misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s later ideas. In opposition to that judgement, this article argues that Wittgenstein’s posthumous diagnosis of autism provides a new interpretation of his positive doctrines and of his negative doctrines alike, proposing a revaluation of Russell’s reaction to them. (xsd:string)
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  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.31977/grirfi.v19i1.1128 ()
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  • 2178-1036 ()
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  • 1 (xsd:string)
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  • A filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein à luz do diagnóstico de autismo (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • In: Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 19, 2019, 1, 226-253 (xsd:string)
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  • 19 (xsd:string)