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  • I argue that the transparency reforms that have been implemented in the Council of the EU in the last decades are unlikely to change the perception of the Council as a non-transparent institution. My argument is based on three distinctions: the distinction between transparency (availability of information) and publicity (spread and reception of information); between transparency in process and transparency in rationale; and between plenary and committee decision-making arenas in legislatures. While national parliaments tend to have all these features, the Council of the EU only has two (transparency in process and committee decision-making). As a consequence, publishing ever more documents and detailed minutes of committee meetings is unlikely to strengthen the descriptive legitimacy of the Council. Furthermore, I argue that the democratic transparency problem is the reverse of what is most often argued: It is not the lack of transparency that causes a democratic deficit, but the (perceived) lack of a democratic infrastructure that makes more serious transparency reforms unthinkable to government representatives. (xsd:string)
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  • 2017 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2017 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.17645/pag.v5i3.941 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 2183-2463 ()
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  • 3 (xsd:string)
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  • The Puzzle of Transparency Reforms in the Council of the EU (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Politics and Governance, 5, 2017, 3, 87-90 (xsd:string)
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  • 5 (xsd:string)