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  • Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod's research on iterative prisoner's dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player-version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners' dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some 'nice' strategies like 'tit-for-tat' are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, this does not solve the cooperation problem. On the contrary, the relative success of some 'nice' conditional cooperative strategies is paralleled by a rapid decline of cooperation in large groups. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 1989 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 1989 (xsd:gyear)
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  • de (xsd:string)
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  • 2 (xsd:string)
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  • Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma: Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Analyse & Kritik - Zeitschrift für Sozialtheorie, 11, 1989, 2, 134-153 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-52693 ()
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  • 11 (xsd:string)