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  • Quotas, including youth quotas for representative institutions, are usually evaluated from within the social justice discourse. That discourse relies on several questionable assumptions, seven of which I critically address and radically revise in this contribution from a libertarian perspective. Temporal justice then takes on an entirely different form. It becomes a theory in which responsibilities are clear and cannot be shifted onto the shoulders of the weak and innocent. I shall only briefly sketch some outlines and general implications of such a theory, arguing that it offers to little guidance for our imperfect world. While that implies more tolerance for quotas, I nevertheless propose an alternative more suited to a representative, deliberative democracy: veto rights. (xsd:string)
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  • 2015 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2015 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.24357/igjr.7.2.431 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 2190-6335 ()
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  • 1 (xsd:string)
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  • Temporal Justice, Youth Quotas and Libertarianism (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • In: Intergenerational Justice Review, 1, 2015, 1, 56-62 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-455305 ()
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  • 1 (xsd:string)