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  • In the first part of this paper I intend to argue that anthropologists have a predominantly causal conception of explanation and that the only feasible way to avoid this is to apply consistently the assumption of goal-orientation of behaviour, that is to hold what could broadly be called a teleological conception of explanation – a view that developments are due to the purpose or design that is served by them. Further on I will try to show that groups and norms do not exist and act independently of people. They have no existence as “things” apart from forming a part of the relevant stock of knowledge of the members of society. They can be brought to bear on actions only by people invoking them. Thus we have to make a sharp distinction between the conceptual or notional level of phenomena, and the transactional or processual level, sometimes known as cultural and social respectively. (xsd:string)
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  • 2014 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2014 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.14712/23363525.2014.1 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1804-0616 ()
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  • 2 (xsd:string)
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  • Goals and Behaviour (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Historická sociologie / Historical Sociology, 2014, 2, 9-42 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-423769 ()