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  • A global economic crisis is the most difficult kind of event to predict. This article asks a straightforward question: did anyone come close to anticipating the oil crisis of 1973/74, which represented a new type of historical sequence? Was the likelihood of an oil shock self-evident at the time? To answer this, I examine the degree of awareness in Europe and the United States of the three possible triggering factors: Egypt’s disposition to start a war and enlist the support of oil-producers; the Arab interest in oil conservation and long-term income maximization; and the imbalance in the oil market and the delayed adjustment of oil prices. For each of these topics, I set out both what was expected and what was actually in the offing; the information available to Western analysts and that unknown; the communication noises and the flagrant bias. The conclusion pays tribute to three men – James Akins, Pierre Wack, and Ted Newland – who had guessed what was coming ahead, and explains why their predictions almost succeeded, while others failed. (xsd:string)
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  • 2014 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2014 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.70-93 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 0172-6404 ()
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  • 4 (xsd:string)
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  • Waiting for the energy crisis: Europe and the United States on the eve of the first oil shock (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Historical Social Research, 39, 2014, 4, 70-93 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-404908 ()
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  • 39 (xsd:string)