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  • The intertheoretical relation between economic equilibrium theory and a theory of social institutions is studied in reduced form, i.e. by comparing the central primitives rather than the full formal models. It is shown that equilibrium can be regarded as a limit of institutions with ever more symmetrical power relations. Economic equilibrium theory thus is shown to be an idealization of the theory of social institutions. A provisionary topology which gives substance to the notion of a limit is defined "internally", i.e. by reference to items occurring in the models only. The meta-scientific status of idealization is briefly discussed. (xsd:string)
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  • 1994 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 1994 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • Exchange versus influence: a case of idealization (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Poznan studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities, 38, 1994, 189-203 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-39843 ()
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  • 38 (xsd:string)