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"This article presents an interpretation of Aristotelian phrónêsis and its
relevance for action research. After pointing out some insufficiencies in
how phrónêsis is applied by other interpreters with relevance for action
research, I present my own interpretation of Aristotle’s concept in the
wider context of his thinking on intellectual and ethical virtues. The
article’s conclusion is that phrónêsis is very important for both action
researchers and others. But at the same time, phrónêsis is not a concept
that can be adopted by itself, alone, and in isolation from other intellectual
and ethical virtues or ways of knowing. Phrónêsis is necessary, but at the
same time insufficient. Phrónêsis is not a concept primarily concerned
with learning, inquiry, and research. Its primary focus is “application”,
performance, or enactment. Action research has a lot to learn from
Aristotle, and phrónêsis is definitely among the things to be learned.
Aristotle’s praxis-orientation sticks even deeper, however. This more
profound praxis-orientation becomes quite invisible by operating with
simplified and mutually exclusive divisions between phrónêsis, tékhnê,
and epistêmê, and by conflating other distinctions that were important to
maintain for Aristotle. Aristotle’s profound praxis-orientation is even
more central to action research. It has to do with dialogue or dialectics
whose tasks really are fundamentally concerned with learning, inquiry,
and research." (author's abstract)
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