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?:abstract
  • We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’, any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming agent could be inferred to have ‘average preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issueNumber
  • 1-2 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs (xsd:string)
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?:publicationType
  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70, 2009, 1-2, 164-185 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292156 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 70 (xsd:string)