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?:abstract
  • "Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms to attract more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance-pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance, and (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance-pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect." [author's abstract] (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.10.003 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
is ?:hasPart of
?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issueNumber
  • 2 (xsd:string)
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?:linksURN
is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Performance pay, sorting and social motivation (xsd:string)
?:provider
?:publicationType
  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68, 2008, 2, 412-421 (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-268278 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 68 (xsd:string)