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?:abstract
  • This article is aimed at defining the full-cost pricing as a leader-follower game in two-tier organizations: (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost; (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. In the Cournot oligopoly case, the full-cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules. There exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full-cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules, in terms of gross profit. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.007 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issueNumber
  • 1 (xsd:string)
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  • On the optimality of the full cost pricing (xsd:string)
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?:publicationType
  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68, 2008, 1, 282-292 (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264064 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 68 (xsd:string)