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  • Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct-response method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.001 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issueNumber
  • 3-4 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary-contribution experiments (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 2008, 3-4, 782-793 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-263127 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 67 (xsd:string)