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  • "Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses." (author's abstract) (xsd:string)
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  • 2010 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2010 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.005 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 3 (xsd:string)
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  • Strategic coalition voting: evidence from Austria (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Electoral Studies, 29, 2010, 3, 339-349 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257796 ()
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  • 29 (xsd:string)