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  • We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We find that the degree of price collusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts are made than in periods without contracts, and than in the baseline treatments. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.002 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issueNumber
  • 3-4 (xsd:string)
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  • Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66, 2008, 3-4, 822-836 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-248099 ()
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  • 66 (xsd:string)