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  • Using German establishment-level data, this paper analyses whether wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm-level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions.\ The empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1080/00036840801964708 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issueNumber
  • 22 (xsd:string)
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  • Rent-sharing and collective wage contracts - evidence from German establishment-level data (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Applied Economics, 42, 2009, 22, 2835-2854 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242388 ()
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  • 42 (xsd:string)