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?:abstract
  • After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount. (xsd:string)
?:contributor
?:dateModified
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1080/00036840701604495 ()
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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?:inLanguage
  • en (xsd:string)
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?:issn
  • 1466-4283 ()
?:issueNumber
  • 3 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Mergers and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets (xsd:string)
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?:publicationType
  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
?:sourceInfo
  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Applied Economics, 42, 2009, 3, 297-309 (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242012 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 42 (xsd:string)