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  • This paper provides an economic explanation of the frequent rule changes in the Formula One (F1) motor racing series. In a two-stage model, the FIA (as the organizer of the F1) first decides whether to change the rules or not, and then the racing teams compete in a contest. It turns out that a rule change reduces the teamsâ ™ performances, but also improves competitive balance between the teams. The rule change is implemented, if the FIAâ ™s revenue gain from the latter effect overcompensates the FIAâ ™s revenue loss from the former effect. We provide empirical evidence from F1 seasons in the period 1950-2005 which supports the main implications of the model. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1080/00036840701349182 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 23 (xsd:string)
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  • Rule Changes and Competitive Balance in Formula One Motor Racing (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Applied Economics, 41, 2009, 23, 3003-3014 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-240949 ()
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  • 41 (xsd:string)