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  • This article examines whether there is a political budget cycle (PBC) in countries in the euro area. Using a multivari ate model for 1999–2004 and various election indicators we find strong evidence that, since the start of the Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal policy-makers in the euro area have pursued expansionary policies before elections. In an election year – but not in the year prior to the election – the budget deficit increases. This result is in line with third-generation PBC models, which are based on moral hazard. We also find a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal policy outcomes. (xsd:string)
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  • 2006 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2006 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1177/1465116506063706 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 2 (xsd:string)
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  • Are there Political Budget Cycles in the Euro Area? (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: European Union Politics, 7, 2006, 2, 191-211 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228983 ()
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  • 7 (xsd:string)