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  • Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines. (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2007 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2007 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1177/1368430207084721 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 4 (xsd:string)
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  • Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10, 2007, 4, 581-593 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228460 ()
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  • 10 (xsd:string)