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  • Feminist approaches in epistemology and philosophy of science have frequently been labelled as ’relativist’, both by feminist as well as by non-feminist philosophers. Regularly the so labelled distance themselves from even the mere suspicion of relativist tendencies. There is a remarkable discrepancy between an attributed and a self-declared relativism. Taking the self-declared relativism of Lorraine Code as an example, the article argues that it is a case of a rhetorical not epistemological relativism, better termed as anti-anti-relativism, but that there are nevertheless good reasons for feminists to follow Code along that path. (xsd:string)
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  • 2005 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2005 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1177/1350506805057098 ()
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  • Relativism or Anti-Anti-Relativism? Epistemological and Rhetorical Moves in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
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  • In: European Journal of Women's Studies, 12, 2005, 4, 407-419 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-224900 ()
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  • 12 (xsd:string)