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  • Most analyses of the judicialization of politics focus on judicial policy-making and rights creation; however when judicialization of politics unfolds in a separation of powers political context courts are also involved in distributing power. The task of power delineation among branches of government is different from policy-making or rights adjudication. Judicializing political disputes about power gives courts the opportunity to alter the balance of institutional power, to create stronger executives (or legislatures) and a stronger (or weaker) role for themselves. To illustrate these points, this article examines how the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal (TC) adjudicated a specific type of separation of powers conflict between the Legislature and the Executive from 1990-2005. The analysis of the TC doctrine overtime highlights how the TC has shifted the balance of power in the policy-making process and augmented its influence within the political system. (xsd:string)
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  • 2010 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2010 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1868-4890 ()
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  • 3 (xsd:string)
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  • The judicialization of (separation of powers) politics: lessons from Chile (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 2, 2010, 3, 71-97 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-3234 ()
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  • 2 (xsd:string)