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  • "This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of 'party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or 'poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while 'freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. We also construct a measure of 'political polarization' that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties' strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is increasing in political polarization." (author's abstract) (xsd:string)
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?:dateModified
  • 2005 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2005 (xsd:gyear)
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  • true (xsd:boolean)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • Electoral poaching and party identification (xsd:string)
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?:publicationType
  • Arbeitspapier (xsd:string)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
rdf:type
?:url
?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-117297 ()
?:volumeNumber
  • 2005-17 (xsd:string)