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  • Representative democracy hinges upon the notion of accountability. We examine the mediating effects of political context on economic accountability in a hostile environment – the developing democracies of Central America. We test whether clarity of responsibility mediates the economy's effects on citizens' support for a president using approval ratings. In general, we find that a good economy increases public support for a president significantly more under unified government, but surprisingly, we find that a bad economy decreases public support for a president far more under divided government. Dynamic simulations show that these effects become more pronounced during sustained periods of economic expansion or contraction. (xsd:string)
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  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1868-4890 ()
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  • 3 (xsd:string)
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  • Economic accountability in Central America (xsd:string)
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  • In: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1, 2009, 3, 33-56 (xsd:string)
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  • urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-1110 ()
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