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  • Extant evidence suggests that power-sharing reduces the participation of minorities in civil conflict by alleviating their grievances. Yet, it remains unclear how and to what degree power-sharing should be institutionalized. Moreover, direct attitudinal evidence for the grievance mechanism remains rare. Addressing these gaps, I argue that corporate power-sharing which is constitutionally-enshrined and explicitly recognizes minorities most strongly alleviates their grievances. However, it simultaneously accentuates the importance of relative inter-group comparisons. This means that minorities with a lower relative degree of corporate power-sharing than their 'peers' in the same country and transnational kin population should have higher grievances, irrespective of its absolute level. Using an extensive combination of mass survey data, I test my expectations in a series of hierarchical multi-level models. By highlighting the importance of institutional design, my results have significant implications for policy in multi-ethnic societies and for the scholarly literature on accommodation and grievances more generally. (xsd:string)
?:citation
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?:dateModified
  • 2023 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2023 (xsd:gyear)
?:doi
  • 10.1177/00220027231153583 ()
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  • en (xsd:string)
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  • 1552-8766 ()
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  • 9 (xsd:string)
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  • Inclusion, Recognition, and Inter-Group Comparisons: The Effects of Power-Sharing Institutions on Grievances (xsd:string)
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  • Zeitschriftenartikel (xsd:string)
  • journal_article (en)
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  • GESIS-SSOAR (xsd:string)
  • In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 67, 2023, 9, 1783-1810 (xsd:string)
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?:urn
  • urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100560-3 ()
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  • 67 (xsd:string)