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  • The optimal design of two-part tariffs is investigated in a dynamic model where two firms belonging to the same supply chain invest in R&D (research and development) activities to increase the perceived quality of the final product. It is shown that the replication of the vertically integrated monopolist’s per- formance can be attained using a two-part tariffin which the fee is a linear function of either the up- stream R&D effort or product quality itself. The possibility of relying on R&D figures appearing in the upstream firm’s balance sheet is desirable as quality enhancement might not be observable or verifiable. (xsd:string)
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  • Englisch (EN) (xsd:string)
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  • Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain (xsd:string)
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  • Buch (de)
  • Elektronische Ressource (xsd:string)
  • books (en)
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  • GESIS-BIB (xsd:string)
  • In: European Journal of Operational Research, 2018 no. 270 ; p. 599-605. ISSN 0377-2217 (xsd:string)
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