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  • 1. Introduction; ; Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency; 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution; ; Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule; 5. Majority rule - positive properties; 6. Majority rule - normative properties; 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule; 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule; 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty; ; Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism; 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting; 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting; 13. Multiparty systems; 14. The paradox of voting; 15. Rent seeking; 16. Bureaucracy; 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies; 18. Dictatorship; ; Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance; 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying; 21. The size of government; 22. Government size and economic performance; ; Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions; 24. The impossibility of a social ordering; 25. A just social contract; 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract; 27. Liberal rights and social choices; ; Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?; 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice. (xsd:string)
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  • 2003 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2003 (xsd:gyear)
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  • Englisch (EN) (xsd:string)
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  • 9780521894753 ()
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  • Public choice III (xsd:string)
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  • Buch (de)
  • Monographie (xsd:string)
  • book (en)
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  • Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003.- XIX, 768 S., graph. Darst. (xsd:string)
  • GESIS-BIB (xsd:string)
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