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This study analyzes the rapidly changing nature of the relationship between state and religion in Turkey between 2002 and 2012. In the process, it examines the range of opinions on and the different representations of this relationship in the Turkish social milieu. The study deploys a framework based on the center-periphery cleavage to depict the changing patterns of polarization and conflict resolution during this period.
The study suggests that the social cleavages between the center and the periphery are prominent factors shaping discussions on the state’s interaction with religion. The power struggle derives from the center’s desire to extend its previous privileges and advantages, and the periphery’s determination to share in the same benefits. That the periphery has gained more social capital since the 1980s has fueled these interactions. In the struggle, the Justice and Development Party government has represented the periphery, whereas the Republican People’s Party, the military, the universities, and the higher judiciary have represented the center.
The study focuses on two main cases to explore the trend of this relationship: the teaching of religion by the state, and the rights of religious minorities, including non-Muslim communities and Alevi groups. In general, the Turkish state has taken a similar approach to all religious groups. At the beginning of the new century, the state was skeptical about religious activities, perceiving them as a threat to its sovereignty, especially its secular structure. Thus demands of Islamic groups were perceived as a threat to secularism, while non-Muslims’ demands were seen as a threat to Turkish nationalism. Responses to these demands, especially between 2007 and 2012, proved that these fears were exaggerated.
Overall, despite constant changes through the years, Turkey has never insisted on a complete separation of religion from the state, even in its most secular phase. The time period examined, 2002-2012, witnessed what might be called a “normalization” of the state/religion relationship – that is, religion is no longer viewed as a threat to the state, nor is the state seen as a threat to religion.
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