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  • Although the spatial theory of elections has demonstrated considerable predictive power, there is no agreement on the basic logic of political competition within this setting. Proximity theory holds that voters support the party whose programmatic position is closest to their own preferences, whereas directional theory claims that voters prefer more extreme strategies. Scholars have conducted innumerable competitive tests, but neither theory came out clearly ahead. At the same time, the debate failed to clarify the indistinct theoretical foundations of the directional approach. One argument attributes the effect to strategic discounting of party positions (a bottom-up logic), another argument focuses on symbolic politics (a top-down logic). This conflict cannot be easily resolved by empirical testing because both theories predict the same observable effects, i.e. their predictions are equifinal. This paper aims to disentangle the equifinality problem of directional theory and thereby to clarify the relation of proximity and directional elements in the vote function. Equifinality is considered an artefact of the unrealistic assumption restricting parties to one single position. I propose a model of selective voting where each party is represented by two positions in the political space, one on each side of the neutral point. This model predicts different outcomes resulting from discounting and symbolic politics. Discounting requires voters to weight both positions equally, whereas symbolic politics theory allows for selective mobilization by the political elite. Testing the model with mass survey and manifesto data for a large number of parliamentary elections shows that directional voting reacts mostly to stimuli voters agree with. The directional effect is limited by proximity voting reacting to negative stimuli. This kind of selective mobilization is not fully compatible with strategic discounting, but can be properly explained by symbolic politics theory. Furthermore, directional and proximity voting serve distinct functions. The two theories do not compete to explain the same phenomenon. The theory is then applied to the issue of redistributive politics. Results show that proximity voting is more common for “bread and butter” issues. However, the logic of selective mobilization prevails even in this case. (xsd:string)
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  • CSES-Bibliography (xsd:string)
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  • 2007 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2007 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 24 (xsd:string)
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  • Schizophrenic Spaces: Selective Mobilization, Directional Voting, and the Politics of Redistribution (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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  • Jahrestagung der DVPW-Sektion "Politik und Ökonomie" (xsd:string)
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  • Bibsonomy (xsd:string)
  • In Jahrestagung der DVPW-Sektion "Politik und Ökonomie", 24, 2007 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • 2007 (xsd:string)
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  • 24 (xsd:string)
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